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Neither entirely vertical nor entirely horizontal in essence, resembling an 
intergovernmental cooperation organization in certain respects while 
closer to an international integration organization in others, the WTO 
represents a unique legal order or system of law.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider a situation where the United States, the European Union, and 
Russia introduced a fee for patent registration that is seven times higher for 
foreign than for domestic inventors. All three countries are members of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), which prohibits such discrimination.2 The 
affected foreign inventor brings a suit in domestic courts in all three countries: in 
the United States, the European Union, and Russia, claiming violation of WTO 
law. What results? It could be predicted with a great degree of certainty that the 
U.S. court would dismiss the complaint as prohibited by U.S. law.3 The E.U. 
court would also dismiss the complaint because WTO law, absent a very narrow 
exception, does not have direct effect within the European Union.4 As for the 
Russian court, it would likely refer to WTO law and invalidate the Russian 
government’s regulation providing for the offending requirement.5 Why is there 
such a striking difference in the treatment of WTO obligations by the domestic 
courts among the member states of the same international organization? The key 
to this riddle is in the way that each of the WTO members treats WTO law within 
its domestic legal order.6 One major question in this regard is whether WTO law 
will be given direct effect within the WTO member state’s domestic system.7 
This question is yet to be settled in Russia, one of the recent members of the 
WTO.8 
Russia joined the WTO in 2012 and became its 156th member after 18 years 
of negotiations.9 The protocol on Russia’s accession to the WTO was signed in 
Geneva on December 16, 2011 and took effect on August 22, 2012.10 The 
 
2. The WTO is the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an international agreement 
that had regulated international trade since 1947. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. See infra Part II. 
3. See infra Part III.B.1.  
4. See infra Part III.C (discussing the U.S. and E.U. approaches to WTO law). 
5. See infra Part IV. 
6. See generally infra Part III (discussing the U.S. and E.U. approaches to WTO law). 
7. “Direct effect” or “direct application” in the context of this comment means that WTO law would be 
treated by domestic courts and government bodies as a direct source of domestic law. Direct effect could be 
given to only the WTO agreements themselves or could be extended to WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and 
Appellate Body rulings, or could apply to both. See infra Part III.A. 
8. EU Welcomes Russia’s WTO Accession After 18 Years of Negotiations, EUR. COMMISSION (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=827. 
9. Id.  
10. Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Ratifikatsii Protokola o Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii k Marrakeshkomy 
Soglasheniyu ob uchrezhdenii Vsemirnoi Torgovoy Organizatsii ot 15 Aprelya 1994 g. No. 126-FZ [Federal Law of 
the Russian Federation on Ratification of the Protocol of Accession of the Russian Federation to Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII 
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2012, No. 30, Item 4177; Accessions: Russian Federation, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_ e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
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Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court (“SAC”)11 decided the first case based on 
WTO law on April 11, 2012 and invalidated a regulation imposed by the Russian 
government, which established higher patent registration fees for foreigners in 
Russia.12 A second similar case was decided on August 28, 2012,13 only six days 
after Russia became a WTO member.14 
At the same time, in Section 151 of the Working Party Report on Russia’s 
Accession to the WTO,15 a Russian representative stated that once Russia ratifies 
the Protocol of Accession it will become an integral part of her legal system and 
“[t]he judicial authorities of the Russian Federation would interpret and apply its 
provisions.”16 This statement and the recent jurisprudence of Russian courts 
resulted in a heated debate among Russian legal scholars and practitioners, 
including justices of its highest courts, as to whether the Russian representative 
“meant what he said, [a]nd he said what he meant”17 in the Working Party Report, 
 
11. Until 2014, the Russian federal court system consisted of the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation (Constitutional Court), the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (Supreme Court), the SAC, 
along with corresponding lower courts of general jurisdiction and lower arbitrazh courts. Federal’nyi 
Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o Sudebnoi Sisteme Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 31.12.1996 N 1-FKZ [Federal 
Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on Judicial System of the Russian Federation of Dec 31, 1996 N1-
FKZ] art. 4(3) SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection 
of Legislation] 1997, No.1, Item. 1 (amended 2014). In this system the SAC was the highest court with 
jurisdiction over economic and commercial disputes. See KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. 
RF][CONSTITUTION] art. 127 (Russ.) (Repealed 2014). On February 5, 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed 
into law amendments to the Russian Constitution and relevant constitutional laws which reformed this system 
by consolidating the functions and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the SAC. The reform abolished the 
SAC and established a new consolidated Supreme Court of the Russian Federation with jurisdiction over 
criminal, civil, administrative, and economic cases. See Zakon RF o Popravke k Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii o Verkhovnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 05.02.2014 N 2-FKZ [Law of the Russian Federation on 
Amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation on Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of Feb 
5, 2014 N 2-FKZ] art. 1(6)-(8), SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian 
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No.6, Item. 548; Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii 
Izmenenii v Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o Sudebnoi Sisteme Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 05.02.2014 N 
4-FKZ [Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on Amendments to the Federal Constitutional 
Law of the Russian Federation on Judicial System of the Russian Federation of Feb 5, 2014 N 4-FKZ] art. 1, 
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2014, No.6, Item. 551. Given that the majority of commercial disputes that could involve WTO law 
would be heard by lower arbitrazh courts, and, until recently, by the SAC, this paper will mostly focus on past 
jurisprudence of the SAC. However, the analysis of the opinions and directives of the Supreme Court are also 
highly relevant.  
12. Reshenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF No.VAS-308/12 ot 11 aprelya 2012 g. [Decision of the 
Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation No.VAS-308/12 of Apr. 11, 2012].  
13. See Reshenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF No. VAS-5123/12 ot 28 avgusta 2012 g. [Decision of 
the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation No. VAS-5123/12 of Aug. 28, 2012] (invalidating 
another IP related tariff). 
14. Accessions: Russian Federation, supra note 10. 
15. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WORKING PARTY REPORT ON THE ACCESSION OF THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION, ¶ 15, WT/ACC/RUS/70 WT/MIN(11)/2 (NOV. 17, 2011) [hereinafter WTO WORKING PARTY 
REPORT] .  
16. Id. at para. 151. 
17. DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 51 (2004).  
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and whether Russia thus made a commitment to give WTO law direct effect.18 
Some of the questions regarding the application of WTO law include whether 
private parties can bring suits in Russian domestic courts based on WTO law, 
whether the courts can invoke WTO law to decide such cases, whether WTO law 
can be used to invalidate Russian law or regulations and decisions of 
administrative agencies, whether private parties can be awarded damages for 
violation of WTO decisions by Russia, and whether courts can invoke WTO 
decisions to interpret WTO law and Russian domestic law.19 Thus, Russia entered 
a debate that has been continuing since the inception of GATT—what role 
GATT/WTO law should be given in domestic legal systems?20 Some 
commentators believe that granting domestic legal effect to WTO law might give 
greater protections to the rights of private persons and compel greater compliance 
with WTO norms by the states.21 Others believe that giving direct effect to WTO 
law and opening domestic courts to WTO-based litigation could be dangerous to 
democracy and will put a country applying WTO law directly at a significant 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other WTO members and impinge on its sovereignty due 
to added regulations and obligations under the treaty.22 In addition, direct 
application of WTO law by domestic courts might lead to inconsistent 
implementation of WTO norms.23 This could displace the WTO from its role as 
principle interpreter of WTO norms and produce a body of confusing and 
conflicting doctrine,24 thus weakening the WTO legal system.25 
 
18. Press Release, SAC Dept. of International Law and Cooperation, News of Int’l Legal Cooperation: 
The Implementation of WTO Legal Standards in Judicial Practice (Dec. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.arbitr.ru/int_law_coop/cooperation/72790.html (providing a summary of a conference hosted by the 
SAC to discuss application of WTO law by national courts following Russia’s accession to the WTO). 
19. See infra Parts IV-V. 
20. See Peter Van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 67-68 (3rd ed. 2013) (describing ongoing academic debate on whether WTO law should be 
given direct effect); see also Antonis Antoniadis, The European Union and WTO Law: A Nexus of Reactive, 
Coactive and Proactive Approaches, 6(1) WORLD TRADE REV. 45, 45 (2007); Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, The 
European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: 
TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 71, 104-06 (J.H.H.Weiler ed., 2000); Marco 
Bronckers, The Domestic Law Effect of the WTO in the EU—A Dialogue with Jacques Bourgeois, in TRADE 
AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE EU AND BEYOND 240, 240 (Inge Govaere, et al. eds., 2011); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 
Less than Zero: The Effects of Giving Domestic Effect to WTO Law, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 279, 279-80 
(2008); Alessandra Arcuri & Sara Poli, What Price for the Community Enforcement of WTO Law? (Eur. Univ. 
Inst. Dep’t of Law, EUI Working Papers LAW 2010/01, 2010), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/ 
bitstream/handle/1814/13534/LAW_2010_01.pdf (discussing various issues focused on the varying applications 
and effects of WTO law on domestic systems). 
21. Van den Bossche & Zdouc, supra note 20, at 67. 
22. Id. at 67-68; see also Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, ¶ 46 (stating that direct 
application of WTO law would in effect “deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the 
scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community’s trading partners.”).  
23. Dunoff, supra note 20, at 282; see also Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, ¶ 45 (stating that giving the 
WTO agreements direct effect in the absence of reciprocity from other WTO members could “lead to 
disuniform application of the WTO rules.”). 
24. Dunoff, supra note 20, at 282. 
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The WTO does not require its members to give direct effect to WTO law and 
leaves it up to the members to decide how they will fulfill their WTO 
obligations.26 How any particular member incorporates WTO law in its domestic 
system depends on its constitution, tradition, and a number of political 
considerations.27 While both the European Union and the United States allow 
some of their international treaties to have direct application in their domestic 
legal systems, they both have denied direct effect to WTO law.28 This is generally 
a result of the structure and unique nature of the WTO in the system of 
international law, mainly the leeway left to the participating states.29 
This Comment will explore the reasons and justifications for the United 
States’ and the European Union’s reserved treatment of WTO law within their 
domestic legal systems, and discuss whether Russia should give WTO law full 
direct effect.30 Part II of the Comment briefly describes the WTO system, the law, 
and its dispute settlement mechanism.31 Part III reviews monism versus dualism 
as an approach to international law, and its application to the WTO law using the 
European Union and the United States as examples.32 This section also examines 
how the U.S. courts and the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) treat WTO law 
and WTO rulings.33 Part IV sets out the Russian constitutional approach to 
international law and examines the approaches Russia could take in applying 
 
25. See id. 
26. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XVI(4), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. Paragraph 7.72 of December 22, 1999 Panel Report 
WT/DS152/R makes it clear that WTO system does not create rights and obligations for individuals and there is 
no requirement for direct effect of the WTO law:  
Under the doctrine of direct effect, which has been found to exist most notably in the legal order of 
the [European Community] but also in certain free trade area agreements, obligations addressed to 
States are construed as creating legally enforceable rights and obligations for individuals. Neither the 
GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted by GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order 
producing direct effect. (internal citation omitted). Following this approach, the GATT/WTO did not 
create a new legal order the subjects of which comprise both contracting parties or Members and 
their nationals. 
PANEL REPORT, UNITED STATES— SECTIONS 301– 310 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, ¶ 7.72, WT/DS152/R 
(DEC. 22, 1999) [hereinafter SECTION 301 PANEL REPORT]. 
27. See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 310, 310-13 (1992) (discussing various treaty implementation considerations). 
28.  MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 99 
(2d ed. 2006).  
29. Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395 (ruling that only those WTO measures 
adopted by the EC institutions can be invoked); see also Marco Bronckers, From ‘‘Direct Effect’’ to ‘‘Muted 
Dialogue:’’ Recent Developments in the European Courts’ Case Law on the WTO And Beyond, in VIEWS OF 
EUROPEAN LAW FROM THE MOUNTAIN 403, 415 (M. Bulterman et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the relationship 
between the European Community and WTO provisions, where the European Community refuses to give direct 
effect to WTO law). 
30. See infra Part VI. 
31. See infra Part II. 
32. See infra Part III. 
33. See infra Part III. 
07_WILSON_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015 12:53 PM 
2014 / Russia in the WTO 
330 
WTO law to its domestic system.34 Part V then discusses advantages and 
disadvantages of giving direct effect to WTO law in Russia.35 Part VI concludes 
that although Russia’s Constitution recognizes international treaties as an integral 
part of the Russian legal system, direct application of WTO law and WTO 
rulings in Russia are not fully justified.36 Russia should find a middle ground in 
its approach to reception of WTO law that would allow it to comply with the 
WTO commitments but would not give WTO law blanket direct effect.37 
II. THE WTO, THE LAW, AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
The WTO was established in 1995, replacing GATT, in order to provide “a 
forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to international 
trade.”38 It currently includes 159 member states.39 Discussions and decisions of 
WTO member states regarding the prospects for further liberalization of world 
trade are held in the framework of multilateral trade negotiations (rounds).40 To 
date, eight rounds of negotiations, including Uruguay round, were conducted 
under GATT and the WTO, and in 2001 the ninth round started in Doha, Qatar.41 
Thus, the WTO body of legal rules is comprised of agreements and decisions 
taken in the years 1986-1994 in the Uruguay Round and earlier GATT 
agreements.42 These include the Marrakesh Agreement and the series of annexed 
agreements and legal instruments dealing with trade in goods, services, and 
intellectual property rights.43 
 
34. See infra Part IV. 
35. See infra Part V. 
36. See infra Part VI. 
37. See infra Part VI. 
38. Pascal Lamy, Dir. Gen., WTO, Statement: About the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). The WTO was 
created by a series of treaties known as the Uruguay Round Agreements and under the terms of the “Final Act” 
signed in Marrakesh the WTO replaced the GATT on 1 January 1995. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 26 
(Marrakesh Agreement is also known as the WTO Agreement).  
39. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto 
_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).  
40. See Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto 
_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
41. See Timeline: World Trade Organization, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_ 
profiles/2430089.stm (last modified Feb. 15, 2012) (listing the chronology of GATT and WTO events). 
42. See Pascal Lamy, supra note 1. 
The WTO is a treaty comprising some 500 pages of text accompanied by more than 2,000 pages of 
schedules of commitments. Moreover, 50 years worth of GATT practice and decisions—what we 
call the “GATT acquis”—have been incorporated in what constitutes the new WTO treaty. WTO 
rules are regularly renegotiated.  
Id. 
43. The annexed agreements include the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, consisting of the 
GATT and twelve substantive agreements, such as the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on 
Safeguards; the General Agreement on Trade in Services; and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
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Article XVI(4) of the WTO Agreement stipulates that “[e]ach Member shall 
ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations[,] and administrative procedures 
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.”44 However, as 
mentioned above, WTO rules do not require members to give WTO law direct 
effect in their domestic legal systems, such that it is applicable to domestic courts 
and citizens.45 
The WTO Agreement declares that principle functions of the WTO include 
(1) providing “the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the [WTO] agreements” 
and (2) administration of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes referred to as “Dispute Settlement Understanding” 
(“DSU”), which regulates dispute settlement under all covered WTO 
agreements.46 The DSU is set out in Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement.47 The DSU 
states that the dispute settlement system “is a central element in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”48 Ultimate 
responsibility for settling disputes lies with the Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”), which is comprised of representatives of the member states’ 
governments.49 The majority of WTO litigation relates to trade remedies, 
including anti-dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards.50 Although these 
issues often concern interests of an individual or a company, the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO Agreement is available only to the member states 
and not private parties.51 WTO dispute settlement proceedings, with a few 
exceptions, are confidential.52 Therefore, the only way for private parties to 
contribute to the dispute resolution process at this stage is to submit amicus 
curiae53 briefs.54 This practice is becoming popular, especially in cases of 
 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). See generally Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 26, at Annex 1. While 
the GATT covered only trade in goods the WTO also includes rules covering provision of services and 
intellectual property which were included in the WTO Agreement as Annexes 1B and 1C. See id. 
44. Id. at art. XVI(4). 
45. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
46. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 26, art. III(2-3). 
47. Id. at art. III(3). 
48. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3(2), Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
[hereinafter DSU]. 
49. See generally id. at art. 3 (listing several general provisions concerning the DSB). 
50. See H.E. Elin Østebø Johansen, Chairperson, WTO DSB, Speech on WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
Developments in 2011 (Mar. 13, 2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/speech 
_johansen_13mar12_e.htm (stating that in 2010 and 2011 the majority of the requests for consultation were 
related to trade remedies). 
51. See DSU, supra note 48, at art. 2.1 (stating that with respect to disputes under covered agreement only 
Members can participate in decisions taken by the DSB); see also Sections 301 Panel Report, supra note 26, at 
¶ 7.72. (“[T]he GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of which comprise both contracting 
parties or Members and their nationals.”). 
52. Johansen, supra note 50. 
53. “[A]micus curiae, noun” (Latin: “friend of the court”) “A professional person or organization that is 
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considerable public interest, such as disputes concerning issues of public health 
and safety, protection of animals, and environmental protection.55 
WTO litigation can proceed through two forums: before ad hoc dispute 
settlement panels (“DSP”) and, on appeal, before the standing Appellate Body 
(“AB”).56 After DSB adopts DSP or AB rulings they become a binding legal 
force within the WTO.57 If a country does not implement a WTO DSP or AB 
ruling, the winning party may in some cases exercise pressure to induce 
compliance by the losing party by taking countermeasures.58 One of these 
countermeasures is to introduce retaliatory trade restrictions on imports from the 
other country.59 
According to Article 3(7) of the DSU, a main goal of the DSB is to secure 
the withdrawal by the offending member state of the measures found to be 
inconsistent with WTO rules.60 However, it is important to note that judgments of 
WTO DSP or AB do not automatically result in invalidation of offending 
domestic laws.61 Unlike rulings of domestic courts which can strike domestic 
laws and regulations, the WTO DSP and AP reports can only recommend that the 
offending state bring its laws into conformity with its WTO obligations.62 If the 
state finds that immediate withdrawal of the measures, such as repealing, 
amending, or replacing offending domestic law, is impracticable, it may instead 
provide temporary compensation pending the withdrawal of the inconsistent 
measure.63 Article 22(2) provides that if the offending member state fails to fulfill 
its obligation to implement WTO recommendations and rulings within a 
reasonable period of time, then it will be required to enter into negotiations with 
any party that invoked the dispute settlement procedures.64 This process is 
intended to provide a mechanism for negotiating mutually acceptable 
compensation.65 
 
not a party to a particular litigation but that is permitted by the court to advise it in respect to some matter of law 
that directly affects the case in question.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 40 (11th 
ed. 2004). 
54. See Johansen, supra note 50. 
55. See id. 
56. See DSU, supra note 48, at art. 3 (discussing the structure for dispute resolution). 
57. See id. (discussing adoption and implementation of DSB rulings). 
58. See CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 239 
(2013). 
59. John J. Barcelo III, The Paradox of Excluding WTO Direct and Indirect Effect in U.S. Law, 21 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 147, 171 (2006). 
60. DSU, supra note 48, at art. 3(7). 
61. VANGRASSTEK, supra note 58, at 238-39. 
62. Id. 
63. DSU, supra note 48, at art. 22(1). 
64. Id. at art. 22(2). 
65. Id. 
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III. WTO LAW IN DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS OF  
WTO MEMBER STATES 
A. Monism v. Dualism in International Law 
Whether any particular international treaty, including the WTO, should have 
direct effect in a member state’s legal order depends on the constitutional 
requirements, policies, and tradition of the reception of international law by that 
member state.66 There are two major approaches to the reception of international 
law: monistic and dualistic.67 The dualistic approach views international law and 
domestic law as completely different systems and does not allow the norms of 
international treaties to become a part of the domestic legal system.68 Hence, 
there is no direct application or direct effect.69 Instead, it requires transformation 
of international law into national law, usually through the act of its legislative 
body.70 When a state accepts a treaty, it has to create national laws explicitly 
incorporating the state’s obligations under the treaty into domestic order.71 Only 
these newly created domestic laws will give rise to rights and obligations 
assumed under the treaty within the domestic legal system and only they can be 
invoked by private parties and applied by domestic courts.72 Thus, treaty 
obligations cannot be directly enforced by domestic courts.73 If the state’s 
domestic laws or acts violate provisions of the treaty, the enforcement could 
come only via international processes available under the treaty.74 The monistic 
approach, on the other hand, allows international laws to integrate directly into 
domestic legal system and even to prevail where domestic laws would be 
inconsistent.75 Even if domestic laws are adopted, international law can still be 
directly applied and adjudicated in national courts.76 
 
66. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 90. For a thorough discussion of the place of international 
treaties within domestic systems and the policy considerations associated with different models of treaty 
implementation see Jackson, supra note 27, at 311. 
67. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 89; JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND 
CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (2006). See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-34 (7th ed.2008). 
68. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 89-90; Jackson, supra note 27, at 313. 
69. Jackson, supra note 27, at 314. 
70. Bourgeois, supra note 20, at 90-91; JACKSON, supra note 67, at 123; Jackson, supra note 27, at 315. 
71. Jackson, supra note 27, at 314. 
72. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (7th rev. 
ed. 1997). 
73. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 314. 
74. Id. at 318. 
75. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 89.  
76. How Does International Law Apply in a Domestic Legal System?, THE PEACE AND JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementation-resources/dualist-and-monist (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2014). 
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Each of these approaches has its pros and cons in facilitating states’ relations 
with international law.77 The dualistic approach is thought to support the notion 
that international law should not interfere with the internal affairs of a sovereign 
state through direct application.78 This approach gives the state more freedom and 
flexibility in dealings with international obligations.79 
The monistic approach, on the other hand, is believed to promote supremacy, 
effectiveness, and respect for international law and supports authority of 
international treaties.80 However, in the context of multinational organizations, 
monist countries may often find themselves in significant disadvantage vis-à-vis 
dualist countries.81 For example, monist countries, by giving direct effect to the 
treaty norms, would allow individuals to rely on these norms in bringing actions 
in their domestic courts in order to invalidate domestic laws or seek damages.82 
However, this option would not be available in the countries taking a dualist 
approach under the same treaty.83 Direct application may restrict the flexibility of 
monist countries’ governments and reduce their bargaining power in international 
negotiations or lead to significant restrictions in the ability of the government to 
implement desired domestic policies.84 At the same time, none of these 
restrictions would exist for other members of the same international organization 
if they belong to the dualist group of countries that do not give direct effect to 
international law within their domestic systems.85 According to Professor John 
 
77. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 310. 
78. See JACQUES BOURGEOIS & ORLA LYNSKEY, The Extent to Which the EC Legislature Takes Account 
of WTO Obligations: Jousting Lessons from the European Parlament, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS 202, 205 n.10 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds., 2008) (stating that the European 
Parliament assumes that denying direct effect to WTO law protects interests of the European community). 
79. It allows the state to interpret and tailor the language of the treaty through the act of transformation 
for domestic usage or even “preserve the option to breach the treaty in its method of application.” See Jackson, 
supra note 27, at 323-26. 
80. See Dunoff, supra note 20, at 281. 
81. Jackson, supra note 27, at 326-27. Jackson notes that although direct application creates significant 
constraints on the state government and creates certain disadvantages, it could be useful in some cases. Id. For 
example, this would provide for an effective mechanism to create a strong union of independent states or for 
incorporation of international human rights norms into domestic legal systems. See id. It also could be argued 
that the monistic approach could help put necessary checks on the state government in order to preserve the 
market-oriented economic system of a state with new market economy. See id. 
82. See id. at 323-27. 
83. According to John Jackson the monistic approach can also result in other difficulties, such as (1) the 
power of interpretation of international treaties can shift from the government to the courts, (2) international 
interpretations of treaty norms may become binding on domestic legal institutions of these countries, including 
their courts, (3) this could create a sort of a supervisory review power by the international organization over 
domestic application and interpretation of the treaty norms, (4) the state may find itself bound not only by the 
norms of international treaty to which the state subscribed upon accession but also by numerous other 
regulations or decisions of adjudicatory bodies of the international organization. These restrictions would be 
exacerbated for the states which constitutions require not only direct application of international law but also 
provide for supremacy of international norms within domestic legal system. See id. 
84. See Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20, at 4. 
85. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 315. 
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Jackson, this creates an unfair asymmetry in the positions of member states, 
which could only be avoided by requiring reciprocity or by restricting direct 
application of the treaty by the monist member states.86 Jackson suggests that 
requirement of reciprocity could be a solution but might create uncertainty.87 
Furthermore, for some members of multinational organizations it would be 
impossible to achieve direct application of international treaties without 
significant constitutional changes.88 On the other hand, experience demonstrates 
that a monist state faced with the problem of unfair asymmetry is more likely to 
make adjustments.89 This can be achieved either via constitutional changes, 
through action of domestic courts or other domestic institutions by restricting 
invocability90 of the treaty, or by distinguishing between self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties.91 
Thus, many states have employed a “mixed” monist-dualist approaches to 
international law, including the European Union and the United States.92 After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia took a strict monist position towards 
international law,93 but it appears to be slowly moving towards a more balanced 
approach.94 After becoming a WTO member, Russia is facing the same important 
policy considerations as other monist WTO member states.95 These policy 
concerns should be carefully examined and evaluated in arriving at a conclusion 
as to whether WTO law should or would have direct application in Russia.   
  
 
86. See id. at 326. 
87. Id. at 320.  
88. Id. at 328 (stating that some states can never permit direct application of international treaties). 
89. See id. at 317, 327-28. 
90. Id. (stating that invocability can be restricted by a court’s determination as to who is entitled to rely 
on the treaty and for what purpose or by establishing requirements for particular parts of the treaty to apply 
,e.g., specific and precise language). 
91. In most cases direct application of a treaty is possible only for “self-executing” treaties. See Jackson, 
supra note 27, at 320. 
92. See id. at 320-21. 
93. Art. 15 (4) of the Russian Constitution states that “the universally-recognized norms of international 
law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal 
system.” KONST. RF art. 15(4). 
94. 1995 Law on International Treaties of the Russian Federation distinguishes between self-executing 
and non-self-executing treaties. See Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorakh Rossiiskoi ot 15 
Iulya 1995 g. [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian Federation], 
Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] Apr. 
15, 1994], July 17, 1995, No.29, Item 2757. 5. 
95. See infra Parts IV-V. 
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B. The U.S. Approach to WTO Law 
1. Domestic Effect of WTO Agreements  
While the United States allows for some international treaties to have direct 
effect,96 it declared WTO law non-self-executing and took a dualistic approach in 
implementing WTO obligations into the domestic legal system.97 WTO law is 
implemented in the United States via “amending existing federal statutes that 
would otherwise be inconsistent with the [WTO] agreements and, in certain 
instances, by creating entirely new provisions of law.”98 The Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (“URAA”)99 sets out the relationship of the WTO agreements to 
the U.S. domestic law.100 This relation consists of three main principles:101 (1) the 
WTO agreements are not self-executing and require implementing legislation 
such that only the implementing legislation has the effect of the law in the United 
States;102 (2) the U.S. law has supremacy over the WTO agreements and no 
provision of the WTO trade agreements inconsistent with the U.S. law will have 
any effect in the United States103 and (3) the WTO trade agreements are not a 
basis for any private right of action104 and may not be referred to in order to 
 
96. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law § 111(1) (1987) (“International law and 
international agreements of the United States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the 
several States.”); id. (“Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to 
international agreements of the United States, except that a “non-self-executing” agreement will not be given 
effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.”). 
97. Patrick C. Reed, Relationship of WTO Obligations to U.S. International Trade Law: Internationalist 
Vision Meets Domestic Reality, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 209, 214-15 (2006), available at http://www.thefreelibrary. 
com/Relationship+of+WTO+obligations+to+U.S.+international+trade+law%3a. . .-a0159280330. Although 
WTO law was expressly pronounced non-self-executing by the Act of Congress, it is possible that the courts 
would come to the same conclusion because they could find that WTO agreement “manifests an intention that it 
shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation” or that 
“implementing legislation is constitutionally required.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111. 
98. Reed, supra note 97, at 215. 
99. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act is a domestic statue implementing the U.S.’s WTO obligations 
arising out of the Uruguay Round agreements. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 
4808 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).  
100. Uruguay Round Agreements Act §102(a), 19 U.S.C. §3512(a) (1994).  
101. Reed, supra note 97, at 214.  
102. MATSUSHITA ET AL, supra note 28, at 94. 
103. Uruguay Round Agreements Act §102(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (“No provision of any of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is 
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”). The Statement of Administrative Action, 
which is the “authoritative expression of the United States” on the domestic interpretation and application of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, further emphasize the meaning of section 102(a) as following: “[t]he WTO will 
have no power to change U.S. law. If there is a conflict between U.S. law and any of the Uruguay Round 
agreements . . . U.S. law will take precedence . . . .” Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of 
Administrative Action, H.R. REP. No. 103-316 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040.  
104. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 103(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(A) (“No person other than the 
United States—(A) shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements or 
by virtue of congressional approval of such an agreement”). 
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“challenge . . . any action or inaction by any federal department [or] agency” as 
inconsistent with the WTO trade agreement.105 Clarification of this provision by 
the Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”) accompanying the URAA is 
particularly instructive, stating that: 
[S]ection 102(c) represents a determination by the Congress and the 
Administration that private lawsuits are not an appropriate means for 
ensuring state compliance with the Uruguay Round agreements. Suits of 
this nature may interfere with the President’s conduct of trade and 
foreign relations and with suitable resolution of disagreements or 
disputes under those agreements.106 
2. Domestic Effect of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports 
The URAA explicitly determines that WTO dispute reports have no 
automatic effect on the U.S. law.107 U.S. Congress will have to act pursuant to 
normal legislative processes before any change to the WTO-inconsistent law can 
be made.108 Practices of administrative agencies are also shielded from automatic 
compliance with WTO DSP or AB reports.109 Instead of immediate correction of 
its practice in accordance with the WTO DSP report, the offending agency is not 
to make any modifications unless and until the head of the agency and the U.S. 
Trade Representative complete consultations with congressional committees and 
relevant private sector actors.110 
 
105.  Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 103(c)(1), 19 U.S.C § 3512(c)(1)(B) (“No person other than the 
United States—. . . (B) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction 
by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision 
of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with such agreement.”). 
106. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. REP. NO. 103-316, 
(1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4055. 
107. Dunoff, supra note 20, at 284.  
Reports issued by panels or the Appellate Body under the DSU have no binding effect under the law 
of the United States and do not represent an expression of U.S. foreign or trade policy. They are no 
different in this respect than those issued by GATT panels since 1947. If a report recommends that 
the United States change federal law to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay Round agreement, it 
is for the Congress to decide whether any such change will be made. 
Id.at 4318. 
108. Dunoff, supra note 20, at 284. 
109. According to the SAA, “panel reports do not provide legal authority for federal agencies to change 
their regulations or procedures or refuse to enforce particular laws or regulations” and “neither federal agencies 
nor state governments are bound by any finding or recommendation included in such reports.” Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. REP. No. 103-316. 
110. 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1) (2000). 
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3. Application of WTO Law by the U.S. Courts 
Thus, URAA disallows direct application of WTO law in the United States.111 
Accordingly, the U.S. courts are precluded from directly relying on WTO law, 
including WTO DSP and AB rulings.112 U.S. courts must apply unambiguous 
U.S. law that clearly violates WTO norms and disregard WTO agreements and 
rulings.113 As discussed earlier, private litigants may not bring actions based on 
WTO law.114 Relevancy of WTO law in U.S. domestic litigation then may only 
arise in situations where domestic law is ambiguous and allows for several 
different interpretations.115 In such situations, two doctrines of statutory 
interpretation come into play, the so called Chevron and Charming Betsy 
doctrines.116 Generally, under Murray v. The Charming Betsy (“Charming 
Betsy”),117 the U.S. courts should interpret ambiguous federal statutes in a way 
that would make them compliant with U.S. international obligations, thus giving 
international law indirect effect.118 As it was stated by Chief Justice Marshall in 
Charming Betsy, “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”119 Thus, once the court 
has determined that the statute can have more than one interpretation, it should 
give preference to the interpretation that is consistent with U.S. international 
obligations in accordance with Charming Betsy. 
However, the Charming Betsy doctrine is almost never applied when U.S. 
courts interpret statutes that could be in violation of WTO law, and particularly 
WTO dispute settlement rulings.120 This is in part because U.S. domestic courts 
cannot order a U.S. agency to change its interpretation of domestic law or its 
practice in accordance with WTO DSP or AB rulings.121 U.S. agencies are 
explicitly prohibited from making such changes, outside of specific political 
process specified by URAA where the Executive Branch alone has the power to 
 
111. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2  
112. See Barcelo, supra note 59, at 148-49. 
113. Id. at 151; Jane A. Restani, Interpreting International Trade Statutes: Is the Charming Betsy 
Sinking?, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1533, 1544 (2001) (“[I]f the domestic statute is clear, the U.S. court must 
apply it as written, whatever the consequences to international considerations and the views of international 
organizations”).  
114. 19 U.S.C § 3512(c)(1). 
115. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 151. Most such cases would entail challenges to the interpretation of U.S. 
trade laws by executive agencies responsible for implementation of these laws. See Dunoff, supra note 20, at 
285. 
116. Restani, supra note 113, at 1544 (addressing interrelationship between the Chevron and Charming 
Betsy doctrines). 
117. See generally Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
118. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 155. 
119. Murray, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118. 
120. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 153. 
121. See id. at 164; see Restani, supra note 113, at 1544 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) (1994); 19 U.S.C. § 
3538(a)-(b) (1994)). 
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decide whether to implement WTO rulings.122 This can only occur after 
consultations with certain Congressional committees and interest groups in the 
private sector.123 At this point then, the Chevron124 doctrine of statutory 
interpretation comes into play. Once the court determines that the statute is 
ambiguous as to the intent of the legislator, Chevron requires the court to defer to 
any interpretation stated by the federal agency charged with its implementation 
that the court can find reasonable, even if it is contrary to WTO law.125 Thus, 
where a federal agency interprets a statute in accordance with WTO law, the 
court may use Charming Betsy to confirm that the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable and should prevail.126 Yet, where the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute and its practice implementing such interpretation are in violation of WTO 
law, Chevron will usually trump Charming Betsy, and the court will defer to the 
agency’s interpretation of a domestic statute.127 
Chevron and many subsequent decisions emphasized that respect for 
separation of powers requires that courts leave interpretation of ambiguous 
statutes to executive agencies.128 This is so because agencies operate under the 
President, who is accountable to the voters, and thus are more suitable than the 
courts to make required policy decisions.129 Additionally, the courts should not 
impinge on the power of Congress vested in administrative agencies.130 This 
position of U.S. courts is well demonstrated as is seen by the numerous decisions 
on the use of “zeroing” by Commerce, where courts found time after time that a 
domestic statute131 was ambiguous and deferred to Commerce’s reasonable 
interpretation of that statute.132 These decisions uphold use of the “zeroing” 
method in calculation of antidumping duties to be imposed on U.S. importers, 
 
122. See 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g). 
123. Id.  
124. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
125. Chevron established a two-step test in order to decide whether the agency interpretation of the 
statute in questions should be sustained. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-3. The first step requires determination of 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If the court finds that 
Congress had a clear intention “on the precise question at issue”, that intention is the law and must be given 
effect. Id. at 842-43. If the court finds that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question 
at issue, then the court has to decide “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.” Id. at 843. 
126. See, e.g., Fed. Mogul Corp. v. Unites States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
127. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 156. 
128. Reed, supra note 97, at 212.  
129. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66. 
130. Id. at 865-66. 
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (2006). 
132. See Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying Chevron analysis 
to determine that the Dept. of Commerce’s practice of using zeroing in administrative reviews was a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute); see Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(extending Timken to encompass Commerce’s practice of zeroing in investigations and emphasizing that 
Congress provided for a political process to decide whether to conform U.S. law to a WTO ruling). 
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even where the WTO AB found that use of zeroing was inconsistent with U.S. 
WTO obligations.133 Two additional considerations provide rationale for keeping 
the decisions about WTO compliance within the executive branch and away from 
domestic courts. First, as many commentators including Professor John J. 
Barcelo III have noted, the WTO DSU provides political mechanisms for 
member states to respond to an adverse WTO ruling and is rather ambiguous 
about whether a member state has an international law obligation to actually 
change its domestic law in order to comply with such a ruling.134 As long as such 
uncertainty exists, domestic courts should not interfere with political decisions of 
the executive branch in its dealings with the WTO.135 
Second, the wisdom of giving direct or indirect effect to WTO rulings by 
domestic courts, particularly those that do not directly involve the United States, 
has been questioned by some U.S. commentators on the grounds that WTO 
dispute settlement rulings do not have firm stare decisis effect.136 
  
 
133. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil 
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2004); see also Panel Report, United 
States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916—Complaint by the European Communities, WT/DS136/R and Corr.1 (Sept. 26, 
2000); Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from 
Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (Aug. 23 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination 
on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11 2004). 
134. Barcelo, supra note 59, at 165. 
135. See id. at 165-67. 
136. E.g., John D. Greenwald, A Comparison of WTO and CIT/CAFC Jurisprudence in Review of U.S. 
Commerce Department Decisions in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 21 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 261, 268 (2013); see DSU, supra note 48, at art. 3(2). For discussion of cases where WTO panels did 
not follow Appellate Body decisions, so called “vertical dissent” see Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Horizontal and 
Vertical Disagreement in WTO Dispute Settlement, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 44 (2012) and Gilbert Guillaume, 
The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETT. 5, 12 (2011). 
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C. The European Union Approach to WTO Law 
Although the European Union is relatively open to international law, WTO 
law does not have direct effect in the European Union.137 In the absence of a 
statute, similar to the United State’s URAA limiting direct application of WTO 
law within the domestic legal system, the role of the WTO law within the 
European Union became determined under the jurisprudence of the ECJ.138 
The ECJ, the highest court in the European Union, developed tests on 
whether and when WTO law would have direct effect within the European Union 
as it considered cases brought by private litigants attempting to use WTO law to 
invalidate E.U. law,139 or to obtain damages under the E.U.’s non-contractual 
liability provision.140 With a few narrow exceptions, the ECJ has continually 
stated that WTO law does not have direct effect within the European Union and 
declined to invalidate E.U. law on the basis of WTO law or to award damages to 
private entities.141 This is true even in cases where the WTO DSB declared the 
European Union’s behavior inconsistent with WTO obligations.142 An analysis of 
ECJ jurisprudence in WTO related cases will help elucidate the reasoning the 
ECJ has used in limiting direct application of WTO law in the European Union. 
The ECJ first invoked a theory of direct effect in the case of Van Gend143 in 
1963, when it decided that certain provisions of European Communities law144 
could be directly applied in the courts of member states to invalidate their law or 
actions.145 This case was decided at the beginning of the modern European Union 
and allowed the ECJ to pronounce “a new legal order” and set up an initial test 
 
137. See PIET EECKHOUT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL 301 (2005) (stating that there is often a presumption in favor of direct effect of international 
agreements, with the exception of the GATT and the WTO agreements); see also Antoniadis, supra note 20, at 
45-46. 
138.  For discussion of ECJ jurisprudence on WTO law see infra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.  
139. Joined Cases 21-4/74, Int’l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (International 
Fruit), 1972 E.C.R. 1219.  
140. E.g., Joined Cases C-120/06 & C-121/06, FIAMM and Fedon v. Comm’n and Council (FIAMM) 
2008 E.C.R. I-6513. For analysis of ECJ WTO related cases, including cases brought under non-contractual 
liability provisions see generally Bourgeois, supra note 20; Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20; John Errico, The WTO 
in the EU: Unwinding the Knot, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 179 (2011).  
141. See, e.g., Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395; see, e.g., FIAMM, 2008 E.C.R. I-
6513. 
142. See Errico, supra note 140, at 184. 
143. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expedetie Onderneming van Gend en Loos NV v. 
Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen (Van Gend ), 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
144. At that time the European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”), established by the ECSC Treaty in 
1952; the European Economic Community (“EEC”) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(“Euratom”), created under the Treaties of Rome in 1958. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11[hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.  
145. See Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
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for when the provisions of the EEC Treaty of Rome146 could be invoked directly 
before the courts of the member states.147 In Van Gend, the plaintiff attempted to 
use Article 12 of the EEC Treaty to invalidate an action of a member state.148 He 
complained that the member state increased tariffs on a chemical—urea-
formaldehyde—by reclassifying it into a different category, and that this action 
violated the provisions of Article 12.149 The ECJ ruled that provisions of Article 
12 created individual rights enforceable in national courts because they 
established a “clear” and “unconditional” “negative” obligation of the member 
states where no further legislative enactment by the member state was required.150 
Nine years later in International Fruit the ECJ explored whether certain 
provisions of GATT law could also have direct effect, or be invoked in a case 
against the Community, before the ECJ. 151 The court answered in the negative.152 
The ECJ declared that international law, including GATT, could invalidate 
Community law only if it satisfied two conditions: first, the provision of 
international law must bind the Community; and second, it must be “capable of 
conferring rights on citizens of the Community, which they can invoke before the 
courts.”153 The Court found that GATT provisions were binding on the European 
Community but, after examining “the spirit, the general scheme and the terms” of 
the GATT, the ECJ declared that the provisions of the GATT did not confer 
rights on citizens of the Community “on which they can rely before the courts in 
contesting the validity of a Community measure.”154 This was because the GATT 
was “based on the principle of negotiations undertaken on the basis of reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous arrangements” and due to “great flexibility” of 
GATT provisions, “in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation, 
the measures to be taken when confronted with exceptional difficulties and the 
 
146. This case was decided only five years after the creation of the EEC in 1958. See EEC Treaty, supra 
note 144.  
147. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1; see Errico, supra note 140, at 184. 
148. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
149. Article 12 of the EEC Treaty states that “[m]ember States shall refrain from introducing between 
themselves any new customs duties on imports and exports or any charges having equivalent effect, and from 
increasing those which they already apply in trade with each other.” EEC Treaty, supra note 144, art 12. 
150. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1. The rights created by Article 12 could have direct effect because, after 
examining “the spirit, the general scheme and the wordings” of the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ found that the EEC 
created by the Treaty constituted a new legal order of international law where member states limited their 
sovereign rights and intended for the Treaty to have direct authority in the member states. Id.  
151. International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. I-1219. In this case, an importer of apples challenged several 
regulations of the European Commission as violating GATT Article XI which provides that “[n]o prohibitions 
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, . . . shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party. GATT, supra note 2, at 
art. XI. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. 
154. See id. at ¶¶ 18, 27. 
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settlement of conflicts between the contracting parties.”155 Thus, individuals could 
not invoke GATT provisions before national courts to examine the validity of the 
Community regulations restricting the importation of apples from third 
countries.156 In the first case of Bananas, the court confirmed its position in 
International Fruit, stating that because the provisions of the GATT did not have 
direct effect, they could not serve as a criterion for legality of Community law.157 
After the GATT was transformed into the WTO upon conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations, the question about whether 
WTO law could have direct effect had to be revisited. The opportunity presented 
itself in the case of Portugal v. Council.158 In this case Portugal complained that 
the Council’s decision concluding the Memoranda of Understanding with India 
and Pakistan on market access for textile products during the Uruguay Round 
violated certain provisions of the GATT, the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing, the Agreement on Import Licensing and general principles of 
Community law such as the principle of transparency, the principle of 
cooperation, and the principle of legitimate expectations.159 Although the court 
acknowledged that the WTO dispute resolution system was an improvement 
compared to the GATT, the Court concluded that it still gave considerable 
importance to the negotiations between the parties, allowing for a possibility of 
compensation or retaliation against the party whose legislation was found to be 
inconsistent with the WTO agreements.160 Thus, the Court held that: 
[H]aving regard to their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are 
not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to 
review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions.161 
In this opinion, the Court further explained its main concerns with the WTO 
structure and operations: (1) the lack of reciprocity and (2) the freedom of the 
political institutions.162 Reciprocity was a concern because the most important 
commercial partners of the Community did not allow their domestic courts to 
review the legality of their legislation according to WTO law.163 The freedom of 
the political institutions, the other concern of the Court, would be compromised 
in two ways had the Court given WTO law direct effect within the Community. 
First, “the external aspect”it would weaken the negotiating strength of the 
 
155. See id. at ¶ 27. 
156. Id.  
157. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-4973, at ¶¶ 105109; see Antoniadis, supra note 
20, at 47. 
158. Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395. 
159. Id. at ¶¶ 53 et seq.; see Antoniadis, supra note 20, at 48. 
160. Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, at ¶¶ 35-37. 
161. Id. at ¶ 47. 
162. See id. at ¶¶ 40, 46. 
163. See id. at ¶ 45. 
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institutions within the WTO and among the trading partnersand second, “the 
internal aspect”it would shift the institutional balance in external trade matters 
from the Council and the Commission to the Court.164 
The Court took a different approach with bilateral agreements. In 
Kupferberg165 the Court held that the EEC—Portugal Free Trade Agreement 
(“FTA”) had direct effect and could invalidate Community law.166 After 
discussing the purpose and international origin of the agreement, the ECJ stated 
that Article 21 of the FTA was sufficiently unconditional and precise and 
therefore “directly applicable and capable of conferring upon individual traders 
rights which the courts must protect.”167 
Although the Court generally refused to find that GATT/WTO law has direct 
effect within the Community system, including its more recent cases such as 
FIAMM168 in 2008, it did establish two important exceptions: the Nakajima169 and 
Fediol170 doctrines. According to these exceptions, the Court may review the 
legality of Community measures in the light of WTO rules only when the 
Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed within the 
context of the WTO, or where the Community measure expressly refers to the 
precise provisions of the WTO agreements.171 
Thus, similarly to the United States, the European Union rejected direct 
effect of WTO law.172 However, the ECJ’s approach to WTO law appears to be 




164. See Antoniadis, supra note 20, at 49. 
165. Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. (Kupferberg) 1982 E.C.R. 
3641. 
166. Id. at ¶¶ 90-91. 
167. Id. at ¶ 23.  
168. Joined Cases C-120/06 and C-121/06, FIAMM and Fedon v. Comm’n and Council (FIAMM) 2008 
E.C.R. I-6513.  
169. Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council (Nakajima) 1991 E.C.R. I-2069. 
170. Case 70/87, Fediol v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 1781. 
171. See generally MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28; see generally Errico, supra note 140.  
172. See generally MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28. 
173. See id. In addition to the exceptions allowing for direct application of certain WTO laws, European 
courts apply WTO law indirectly when interpreting domestic laws and regulations via principle of consistent 
interpretation. This principle requires that the laws of both E.U. and E.U. member states receive interpretations 
that are consistent with international obligations. See Antonello Tancredi, EC Practice in the WTO: How Wide 
is the ‘Scope for Manoeuvre’?, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 933, 940 (2004). 
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IV. WHAT IS THE PLACE OF WTO LAW IN RUSSIA? 
A. Constitutional Approach to International Law 
Russia rejected the traditional dualist approach to the implementation of 
international law in a domestic legal system that was prevalent during the Soviet 
period and proclaimed international law to be part of its domestic law.174 
International treaties and commonly recognized principles of international law 
have supremacy within Russian legal system.175 Russian courts “usually rely on 
international law as an additional argument in support of their conclusions based 
on the applicable constitutional provisions.”176 In addition, “if there is a real gap 
in domestic law, courts may apply international law directly in order to make up 
for the deficit.”177 However, application of international law by Russian courts 
has been difficult.178 The courts often “encountered serious difficulties in 
clarifying methods to be used for ascertaining applicable international law rules,” 
which often resulted in arbitrary and sometimes unjustified use of international 
norms.179 
Until 1995, the courts made no distinction between self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties and often directly applied even vague and broad treaty 
rules or principles of international law to justify invalidation of Russian domestic 
law.180 In 1995, the Russian legislature took initiative and passed the Law on 
International Treaties, which differentiated two types of norms.181 It established 
 
174. See KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] art. 15(4) (Russ.) (states 
that “the universally-recognized norms and principles of international law and international treaties of the 
Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system”); see also GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF][Civil Code] art.7 (Russ.) The Russian Civil Code also provides that the 
generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian 
Federation shall be an integral part of the Russian legal system and the norms of the treaties should be applied 
directly, except in cases where an international treaty requires national legislation. Id. 
175. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] art. 15 (4) (Russ.) 
(establishing the superiority of the terms of Russian international treaties over the Russian domestic law: “if an 
international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules different from the rules prescribed by law, the 
rules of the international treaty shall be applied.”). For a thorough analysis of the motivation which Russia and 
many other newly formed democracies in Eastern Europe had for favoring direct application and supremacy of 
international law see generally Jackson, supra note 27 (arguing that the historical experiences of some countries 
could create such a distrust in their governments that the constitution makers would want to abandon a dualistic 
approach to international law in order to constrain their government through supremacy and direct application 
of international norms, thussecuring protection of human rights and implementation of market-oriented 
economic system). 
176. Gennady M. Danilenko, Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice, 10 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 51, 62 (1999). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 51. 
179. Id. at 62. 
180. Id. at 51, 58. 
181. See generally Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorakh Rossiiskoi ot 15 iulya 1995 
g. [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian Federation], Sobranie 
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that there are “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” norms, stating that only 
provisions of international treaties that do not require domestic legislation in 
order to be applied will operate in Russia directly.182 “[F]or the other provisions 
of international treaties domestic acts would have to be adopted.”183 However, the 
1995 law did not provide any guidance on how to identify the non-self-executing 
treaties, other than if they expressly require adoption of domestic laws.184 The 
Supreme Court then instructed lower courts that self-executing treaties can be 
applied directly, while a non-self-executing treaty should “apply, along with the 
international treaty . . . the relevant domestic legal act that was enacted for 
effectuating the provisions of the said international treaty.”185 This created 
additional confusion by requiring the simultaneous application of both domestic 
and international law.186 
The next significant step to understanding when international treaties can be 
invoked by Russian courts came in 2003 when the Russian Supreme Court issued 
a ruling “[o]n Application by the Courts of General Jurisdiction of the Generally 
Recognized Principles and Norms of International Law and International Treaties 
of the Russian Federation.”187 The ruling for the first time formulated the 
attributes of a treaty that can be applied by the courts directly: (1) the treaty has 
come into force; (2) it is binding for Russia; (3) it is officially published; (4) its 
provisions do not require adoption of domestic laws; and (5) it establishes rights 
and obligations for the subjects of national law.188 The ruling also clarified that a 
treaty should not be directly applied when, inter alia, the treaty contains any 
instructions directing member states to amend national laws.189 In other words, 
 
Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1995, No.29, 
Item 2757. 
182. Id. at art. 5(1).  
183. Id.  
184. Id.; see Danilenko, supra note 176, at 65-66. 
185. Postanovleniye Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF “O Nekotorykh Voprosakh Primeneniya Sudami 
Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii Pri Osushchestvlenii Pravosudiya” ot 31 ortyabria 1995 g., N 8 [The 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation Plenary Ruling “On Selected Issues of Application of Constitution of 
the Russian Federation by the Courts in the Administration of Justice” Nov. 31, 1995, N 8], ROSSIISKAYA 
GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.] Dec. 28,1995, No. 247. See Danilenko, supra note 180, at 66. 
186. Danilenko, supra note 180, at 66. 
187. Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF o Primenenii Sudami Obstchey Jurisdiktsii 
Obshepriznanykh Printsipov i Norm Mezhdunarodnogo Prava i Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov Rossiskoi 
Federatsii ot 10 oktyabrya 2003 g., No. 5 [Russian Federation Supreme Court Plenary Ruling on Application by 
the Courts of General Jurisdiction of the Generally Recognized Principles and Norms of International Law and 
International Treaties of the Russian Federation of Oct. 10, 2003, No. 5], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] 
Dec. 2, 2003, No. 244 [hereinafter Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5]. Explanations provided in Supreme 
Court Plenary Ruling No. 5 are used by both by the Supreme Court and the SAC in their decisions regarding 
applicability of specific treaties and norms. See Sergei Yu. Marochkin, International Law in the Courts of the 
Russian Federation: Practice of Application, 6 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 329, 330 (2007), available at http://intl-
chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/2/329.full.pdf+html. 
188.  Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5, supra note 187. 
189. Id. 
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the courts concluded that the constitutional provision, placing international law 
and treaties as an integral part of the Russian legal system and giving them 
supremacy over national laws, has limitations, and that not all treaties can be 
applied directly.190 At least three of these limitations are similar to the tests 
imposed by the ECJ in deciding whether a particular treaty can have direct effect 
in the European Union: (1) the treaty is binding, (2) establishes rights and 
obligations for the subjects of national law, and (3) the norm in question is not 
conditioned on adoption of domestic law.191 The rule that only the treaties that do 
not require adoption of domestic laws can be applied by the courts directly is also 
somewhat similar to the test applied by the U.S. courts in deciding whether a law 
is self-executing.192 
Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5 also shed some light on the status of 
decisions of adjudicatory bodies of some international organizations.193 It 
confirms that the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) is an 
integral part of Russian legal system in accordance with Article 15 of the 
Constitution; therefore, the decisions of the ECHR are binding for Russia.194 The 
ruling then instructs the courts to consider the decision of the ECHR when 
interpreting the norms of European Convention.195 This general understanding of 
how and when Russian courts will apply provisions of international treaties is 
helpful in the discussion of whether WTO law will have direct effect in Russia. 
B. Possible Approaches to Application of WTO Law in Russia 
Two recent cases decided by the SAC in 2012 (the Patent Fees Cases) may 
help shed some light on how Russian courts see the role of WTO law within the 
Russian legal system.196 Both cases were brought by the same businessman from 
the Czech Republic who complained that Russia’s patent agency discriminated 
against foreign inventors by charging them related to patent registration that were 
seven times higher than the fees paid by Russian citizens.197 The SAC found in 
 
190. See Marochkin, supra note 187, at 337. 
191. See International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. at ¶¶ 7-8. 
192. Jackson, supra note 27, at 320 (“When [treaty] language is sufficiently precise and indicates that no 
further government action is needed to apply the treaty norms, a U.S. court will be willing to conclude that the 
treaty is self-executing”); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 
111(1) (1987).  
193. Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No.5, supra note 187. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Reshenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF No. VAS-308/12 ot 11 aprelya 2012 g. [Decision of the 
Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation No. VAS-308/12 of Apr. 11, 2012] [hereinafter SAC 
Decision No.VAS-308/12]; Reshenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF No. VAS-5123/12 ot 28 avgusta 2012 
g. [Decision of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation No. VAS-5123/12 of Aug. 28, 2012] 
[hereinafter SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12]. 
197. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196; SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, supra note 196. 
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favor of the plaintiff in both cases and invalidated the Russian law that created 
different rates for foreigners and citizens.198  
The first case invalidating one of the fees was decided in April of 2012,199 
three months before Russia ratified its WTO accession protocol.200 The second 
case invalidating several other fees was decided in August of 2012,201 just a few 
days after Russia became a WTO member.202 What is particularly interesting 
about these opinions is the SAC’s reasoning and reference to international law, 
including the WTO law. While the SAC primarily relied on the provisions of a 
bilateral treaty between the E.U. and Russia in both cases,203 it also invoked 
provisions of the WTO law.204 The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement205 
(“PCA”) between the European Union and Russia served as a framework for the 
E.U.-Russia economic and political relations since 1997.206 The PCA promotes 
and regulates trade and investment between the two parties and provides for 
some specific rights for the citizens of the member states.207 The court reasoned 
that section 98(1) of this treaty, requiring equal access to the administrative 
dispute resolution bodies for the citizens of all member states, “clearly” 
established “specific” obligations of member states to provide for protection of 
 
198. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12 , supra note 196; SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12 , supra note 196. 
199. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196. 
200. See Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Ratifikatsii Protokola o Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii k 
Marrakeshkomy Soglasheniyu ob uchrezhdenii Vsemirnoi Torgovoy Organizatsii ot 15 Aprelya 1994 g. No. 
126-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Ratification of the Protocol of Accession of the Russian 
Federation to Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONDATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2012, No. 
30, Item 4177. 
201. SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, supra note 196. 
202. Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Ratifikatsii Protokola o Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii k 
Marrakeshkomy Soglasheniyu ob uchrezhdenii Vsemirnoi Torgovoy Organizatsii ot 15 Aprelya 1994 g. No. 
126-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Ratification of the Protocol of Accession of the Russian 
Federation to Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 
2012, No. 30, Item 4177. 
203. Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establishing a Partnership Between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of one side, and the Russian Federation, of the other side, OJ 1997 L 
327/3 [hereinafter Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation]. 
204. See SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196; see also SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, 
supra note 196. 
205. The EU-Russia PCA uses a unique model that is different from the rules for FTAs set forth in Article 
XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS. See PETER VAN ELSUWEGE, THE FOUR COMMON SPACES: 
NEW IMPETUS TO THE EU-RUSSIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP? 334, 335-41 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau 
eds., 2008). 
206. Regions and Countries: Russia, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/russia/ (last updated May 3, 2013). (“The new EU-Russia Agreement—currently under 
negotiation—should provide a comprehensive framework for bilateral relations with stable, predictable and 
balanced rules for bilateral trade and investment relations. It will focus on improving the regulatory 
environment by building upon the WTO rules and strengthen bilateral trade relations.”). 
207. Id.  
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the rights of the citizens of both countries without discrimination.208 Therefore, 
the court determined that the PCA had direct application in Russia.209 Because 
Russia’s offending regulation required higher fees for foreigners to bring their 
grievances to the Chamber of Patent Disputes, it was in direct conflict with 
provisions of Russian international treaty and was therefore held invalid.210 
It should be noted that the same treaty was directly applied by the ECJ 
several years earlier in the Simutenkov case, brought by Russian citizens alleging 
discrimination in the workplace.211 In that case, the ECJ concluded that Russian 
workers legally employed in an E.U. member state could directly invoke the 
PCA’s non-discrimination provision regarding conditions of their employment, 
remuneration, or dismissal as provided in Article 23 of the PCA.212 Thus, both the 
Russian SAC and the ECJ directly applied the norms of this bilateral treaty in the 
domestic legal systems.213 Both courts focused their analysis on whether the 
invoked provision was sufficiently clear and precise, and whether it conferred a 
specific right upon which a citizen may base a claim.214 This approach appears to 
be similar to the ECJ’s approach in Van Gend,215 resulting in direct application of 
the provision of the Treaty of Rome (European Community Treaty) in the court 
of a European Community member state to invalidate the actions of another 
member state. It is also similar to the ECJ’s approach in Kupferberg,216 which 
resulted in direct application of the norms of a bilateral agreement.217 The SAC 
also specifically addressed the reciprocity of the obligations provided for in the 
PSA article 98(1).218 The SAC noted that Russian citizens will be provided the 
same level of protection in the European Union under this section as the citizens 
of the E.U. members are given in Russia.219 This appears to be an important 
consideration in the SAC’s decision that the PSA article 98(1) has direct effect in 
 
208. “Clearly and specifically” [chetko i konkretno]. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.  
209. Id.; SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, supra note 196. 
210. See SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196; see also SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, 
supra note 196. 
211. Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Española de 
Fùtbol, 2005 E.C.R. I-2579. See generally Christophe Hillion, Competence Distribution in EU External 
Relations After ECOWAS: Clarification or Continued Fuzziness?, 46 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 815 (2008) 
(providing an annotation of this judgment). 
212. See VAN ELSUWEGE, supra note 205, at 340.; see FRANCIS C. JACOBS, DIRECT EFFECT AND 
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE RECENT CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 13, 19-21 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau 
eds., 2008). 
213. Simutenkov, 2005 E.C.R. I-2579; SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196. 
214. Id. 
215. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
216. Kupferberg,, 1982 E.C.R. 3641.  
217. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Kupferberg,, 1982 E.C.R. 3641.  
218. Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, supra note 203. 
219. SAC decision No.VAS-5123/12, supra note 196. 
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Russia.220 Again, this consideration of reciprocity corresponds with ECJ 
jurisprudence on whether WTO law can be given direct effect in the domestic 
legal system.221 Neither the reciprocity requirement nor the clarity of the specific 
rights conferred by the treaty represent criteria for direct application of 
international law as it has been discussed in Russian laws or past explanations of 
higher courts.222 This appears to be a new line of reasoning surprisingly similar to 
that of the ECJ when dealing with WTO law.223 
What is even more surprising is that the SAC did not stop its analysis with 
applicability of the PSA in the patent fee cases.224 Rather, the SAC went further 
and invoked the WTO law.225 The court stated: 
In addition, one of the fundamental principles of the WTO . . . is a 
prohibition of discrimination, which follows from the provisions of the 
GATT 1947 (preamble and paragraph 1 Article 3), and, in relation to 
intellectual property, from the TRIPS agreement, adopted in 1994 during 
the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement 
provides that the state should provide the citizens of other countries with 
the same level of rights in relation to the protection of intellectual 
property, which it provides to its own citizens.226 
This may appear diametrically different from the ECJ’s position in cases 
involving WTO agreements where the ECJ continually refused to directly apply 
WTO norms.227 However, at closer examination, the position of the ECJ and the 
SAC may be not very different. First, at the time the SAC invoked WTO law it 
was clearly not binding for Russia, as Russia’s accession to the WTO was not yet 
ratified.228 This discussion of WTO law by the SAC may be seen more as a 
 
220. Id. 
221. See e.g., Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. ¶¶ 43-45; see Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20, at 3; Marco Bronckers, 
The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 443, 444 (2005). 
222. See Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorakh Rossiiskoi ot 15 Iulya 1995 g. [Federal 
Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] Apr. 15, 
1994] 1995, No.29, Item 2757.5; see Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5, supra note 187. 
223. See supra Part III.C. 
224. See SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196; see also SAC Decision No.VAS-5123/12, 
supra note 196. 
225. See SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196. 
226. Id. 
227. See supra Part III.A. 
228. Compare SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196 with Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Ratifikatsii 
Protokola o Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii k Marrakeshkomy Soglasheniyu ob Uchrezhdenii Vsemirnoi Torgovoy 
Organizatsii ot 15 aprelya 1994 g. No. 126-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Ratification of the Protocol 
of Accession of the Russian Federation to Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994] SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2012, No. 30, Item 4177. The SAC decision in this case was issued on Apr. 11, 2012, but Russia’s 
protocol of accession to WTO came into force only on Aug. 22, 2012. See supra note 10. 
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gesture indicating that Russia is willing to be bound by its WTO commitments, 
rather than a real basis for the decision in this case.229 Second, invoking the WTO 
law in this case allowed the SAC to reveal one of the new tests for direct 
application of WTO law, which is similar to the test used by the ECJ in 
Nakajima.230 At the time the SAC was deciding this case, the Russian government 
had already published a new version of the regulation on patent registration fees 
that was in compliance with Russia’s WTO obligations and eliminated all 
discriminating fees.231 The regulation was to take effect upon Russia’s ratification 
of the WTO accession protocol.232 The SAC referred to this regulation as 
evidence that the Russian government explicitly intended to implement its 
particular WTO obligation.233 Just as the ECJ decided in Nakajima, the SAC 
reasoned that the WTO law was directly applicable because there was an explicit 
intent by the Russian government to implement a specific WTO obligation.234 
It remains to be seen what importance this argument will play in future cases. 
It is probably too early to conclude that the WTO law will not have direct effect 
where there is no indication of direct intent by the government in regard to a 
particular WTO norm.235 However, it is clear that in this case the court avoided 
discussing whether the WTO agreement was self-executing and whether it 
confered specific rights on individuals.236 Had this discussion taken place, the 
court would probably have found that Russia in fact adopted numerous new laws 
in the process of WTO accession negotiations in order to bring national law in 
compliance with its WTO obligations.237 This could then be the end of the 
analysis because the Court could find that obligations of member states to amend 
national laws would “deem direct application of that treaty impossible.”238 Why 
then did the Court invoke the WTO law but avoided any discussion of whether it 
required adoption of domestic laws or conferred the rights on individuals?239 
Finding WTO law non-self–executing would completely divest Russian courts of 
the ability to directly apply any of the WTO law provisions.240 However, the court 
appears to be eager to pronounce that it supports the principles of the WTO law 
 
229. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.  
230. See id.; see Nakajima, 1991 E.C.R. I-2069. 
231. Postanovlenie Pravitelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii of Sept. 15, 2011, No 781[Regulation of the 
Government of the Russian Federation] SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2011, No. 39, Item 5487. 
232. Id. 
233. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196. 
234. Id. 
235. Press Release, SAC Dept. of Int’l L. and Cooperation, supra note 18.  
236. See generally SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.  
237. See WTO Working Party Report, supra note 15. 
238. See Supreme Court Plenary Ruling No. 5, supra note 187. 
239. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.  
240. See supra Part IV.A. 
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and is ready to promote Russia’s image as a compliant state.241 Its initial rulings 
on the topic indicate that it is steering away from the U.S. approach of complete 
bar for direct application of WTO law.242 Instead, it appears to be paving the way 
towards the model where the courts could analyze specific provisions of WTO 
law; they then could pick and choose which of them would be directly or 
indirectly applicable in Russia.243 This model resembles the ECJ’s, approach to 
WTO lawgenerally rejecting it direct application, but allowing for 
exceptions.244 
V. ADVANTAGES AND DISATVANTAGES OF GIVING DIRECT EFFECT 
TO WTO LAW IN RUSSIA 
This Section discusses the policy considerations that Russia will have to 
address in deciding how to apply WTO law within its domestic legal order. 
A. Disadvantages of Direct Effect  
The dangers of giving direct effect to WTO law are extensively described in 
literature.245 One of the major concerns includes lack of reciprocity.246 The ECJ, in 
rejecting direct effect to WTO law on numerous occasions, stressed that none of 
the E.U.’s major trading partners247 gave WTO law direct effect, and that giving 
direct effect unilaterally would be detrimental to the E.U.’s interests.248 As A.G. 
Tesauro put it: 
[I]n the absence of reciprocity, to recognize that the provisions in 
question have direct effect would place Community traders in a 
disadvantage compared with their foreign competitors. While the latter 
would be able to invoke provisions in their favour directly before the 
courts of the Member States, Community traders would be unable to do 
 
241. SAC Decision No.VAS-308/12, supra note 196.  
242. See supra note 198-242 and accompanying text. 
243. See Bronckers, supra note 29, at 406.  
244. Professor Marco Bronckers has noted that European Courts apply the principle of “treaty-consistent 
interpretation” to WTO agreements, which allows them to interpret national regulations “as much as possible in 
conformity with WTO law” without giving it direct effect. Id. 
245. See, e.g., Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20, at 3-8; see also supra Part II.A. See generally Dunhoff, supra 
note 20. 
246. See supra Part III.A. 
247. The European Union’s major trade partners include the United States and Japan. Directorate General 
for Trade. Client and Supplier Countries of the EU27 in Merchandise Trade (value %) (2012, excluding intra-
EU trade), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 12, 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/ 
tradoc_122530.pdf. 
248. See supra Part III.C. 
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likewise in the States that refused to recognize that the provisions of the 
WTO agreement may have direct effect.249 
The same concern would apply in the case of Russia.250 If Russian courts 
would allow foreign businesses to bring suits based on direct application of WTO 
law and award damages in cases of Russia’s incompliance with WTO rules, 
Russia would find itself compensating competitors of Russian businesses, thus 
giving them competitive advantage.251 At the same time, Russian businesses 
would never be able to protect their interests against violations by other WTO 
member states in their domestic courts since they do not give direct effect to 
WTO law.252 This would create an uneven playing field for Russian businesses.253 
A second important consideration involves the nature of the WTO 
agreements and its Dispute Settlement System. This system is political in nature 
and accords considerable importance to negotiations between the governments.254 
Domestic courts could interfere in the settlement process by providing remedies 
inconsistent with those envisioned by the Russian government, potentially 
hindering the use of negotiated arrangements to remedy alleged violations within 
the WTO system.255 Direct application would then cause the Russian government 
to have less bargaining power and flexibility than other WTO members in 
negotiating its policies and finding appropriate and mutually acceptable 
solutions.256 Furthermore, WTO law might encroach upon the decision making 
power of the Russian state with regard to many Russian regulations and policies, 
thus, interfering with Russia’s autonomy.257 
 
249. See Arcuri & Poli, supra note 20, at n.28 (citing AG Tesauro opinion in Case C-53/96, Hermes Int’l 
v. FHT Mktg. Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. I-3603). 
250. Id. 
251. See supra Part III.A. It is also important to consider that WTO rulings, as opposed to domestic court 
rulings, are prospective in nature and do not award any compensation for past misconduct of the offending state. 
See EECKHOUT, supra note 137, at 305. 
252. For example, the United States does not allow private lawsuits based on WTO law. See Barcelo, 
supra note 59, at 148-49. 
253. See EECKHOUT, supra note 137, at 305. 
254. See, e.g., Portugal, 1999 E.C.R. at ¶¶ 36-42. 
255. See, e.g., id. 
256. Schwartz and Sykes point to three aspects of the DSU which allow Member states to deviate from 
their commitments under the WTO: (1) provisions giving states a reasonable time to correct WTO-inconsistent 
problems, (2) provisions permitting compensation or the suspension of concessions instead of changing 
behavior, and (3) compensatory nature of sanctions for non-compliance. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. 
Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System 15 (Law 
Sch. U. Chi. John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 143 (2d Series)), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/143.AOS_.wto_.pdf. If Russia was to give WTO law direct effect it 
would be more bound by this law than other WTO Member states. See generally id. 
257. See Bronckers, supra note 29, at 405 (discussing similar concerns in the E.U.); see also JACKSON, 
supra note 67, at 70-76 (providing a more detailed discussion of sovereignty and policy concerns in the US); 
see also Paul G. Hare, Russia and the World Trade Organization 14 (Russian-European Centre for Economic 
Policy, Working Paper Series, July 2002), available at http://www.recep.ru/phase4/en/rp/harewtoe.pdf (noting 
that Russian population perceives WTO accession as “foreign interference in Russian economic policies”). See 
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Finally, if WTO law is given direct effect, then the many hundreds of courts 
in the Russian court system would be involved in the process of application and 
interpretation of WTO law.258 Because most Russian judges do not have 
experience in or knowledge of WTO law, these courts would likely produce a 
volume of inconsistent interpretations.259 In addition, domestic courts would often 
be confronted with issues that had not yet been addressed by the WTO DSB.260 
For example, there are few cases addressing disputes on trade in services.261 
Cases such as these would require that domestic courts interpret WTO law ahead 
of the WTO DSB.262 
These concerns cannot be disregarded.263 Some observers and scholars argue 
that “the supposed benefits of giving domestic effect to WTO dispute reports are 
largely illusory, while the potential costs are substantial.”264 
B. Advantages of Direct Effect  
Illusory or not, there are advantages to having WTO law directly enforceable 
in Russia by Russian courts. First, it is expected that Russia’s accession to the 
WTO will help improve business climates within the country and attract foreign 
 
generally Jackson, supra note 27. 
258. In 2012, there were 2,198 district courts and 83 regional courts within the system of the courts of 
general jurisdiction. See A.V. Gusev, Otchotnyy Doklad General’nogo Direktora Sudebnogo Departamenta pri 
Verkhovnom Sude Rossiyskoy Federatsii Guseva A.V. VIII Vserossiyskomu s”yezdu Sudey, SOVET SUDEY RF, 
http://www.ssrf.ru/page/9253/detail (last visisted Mar.11,2014). There are also 81 courts of the first instance, 20 
appellate courts, 10 regional courts, and one Intellectual Property Court within the system of the arbitrazh 
courts. Struktura Srbitrazhnoy Sistemy RF, VYSSHIY ARBITRAZHNYY SUD RF, http://arbitr.ru/as/assys/struct 
(last visisted Mar.11,2014). 
259. A few decisions of lower courts that addressed applicability of WTO law so far have pointed in 
different directions. Some courts decided that WTO law should be applied but came to the opposite conclusions 
while applying the same WTO norms. Other courts refused to apply WTO law concluding that relevant norms 
were not directly applicable because they required further domestic legislation. See e.g. Postanovleniye FAS 
Moskovskogo Okruga ot 05.12.2013 N F05-15399/2013 po delu N A40-22353/2013 [Decision of the Federal 
Arbitrazh Circuit Court for Moscow Circuit N F05-15399/2013 in case N A40-22353/2013 of Dec. 5, 2013 
(finding that increase of price on Apatite by the seller was justified in accordance with the new government 
regulation promulgated in order to comply with Russia’s WTO commitments and confirming reversal of the 
decision of the court of first instance which concluded that WTO law precluded such an increase); 
Postanovleniye Suda po intellektual’nym pravam ot 06.09.2013 po delu N A41-24588/2012 ”O zashchite 
isklyuchitel’nykh prav ispolniteley i izgotoviteley fonogramm, vzyskanii kompensatsi” [Decision of the 
Intellectual Property Court in case N A41-24588/2012 “About Exclusive Rights of Performers and Phonogram 
Producers, Award of Compensation” of Sept. 6, 2013] (finding that Russia’s WTO commitment to change its 
system of collective management of copyright and related rights to eliminate non-contractual management of 
these rights by collecting societies did not have direct effect). At this point there is no official source for WTO 
law in Russian language. See Press Release, SAC Dept. of Int’l L. and Cooperation, supra note 18.  
260. See, e.g., Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A8#selected_agreement. 
261. To date there were only 23 cases which cited GATS in the request for consultations. See id. 
262. See, e.g., id. 
263. E.g., Dunoff, supra note 20, at 282. 
264. Id. 
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investment.265 The Russian government has long stressed the need for Russia to 
make the transition from commodity-based to innovation-based development266 
by introducing targeted reforms.267 Yet, Russia’s business climate remains poor.268 
The World Bank reported that, while conditions have improved over the past few 
years, Russia remains among the lower-ranked countries for doing business—at 
number 120 out of 183 countries.269 As was noted by many observers, failure by a 
state to establish a predictable rule-based system will halt investment and trade.270 
By becoming a WTO member, Russia has committed to bring its trade laws and 
practices into compliance with WTO rules.271 Improving business climate and 
transparency, as required by the WTO, would not only help to promote trade and 
bring Russia much needed foreign investments, but would also benefit Russian 
businesses and the foreign investors.272 The trade system promoted by the WTO is 
composed “mostly of individual economic operators” and therefore “[i]t is 
through improved conditions for these private operators that Members benefit 
from WTO disciplines.”273 
Giving the courts a greater role in monitoring government actions and 
enforcing WTO rules that benefit private operators would help improve the 
business climate in Russia and would give a clear signal to investors that Russia 
is now a better place for business.274 Giving direct effect to the WTO law within 
Russia would empower individuals to invoke WTO law in Russian courts to 
recover damages or to invalidate inconsistent domestic regulations.275 These 
actions could serve as a vehicle to enhance compliance with WTO norms.276 
 
265. See Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, After WTO Accession: Reform and EU-
Russia Trade Relations, Address at the Seminar of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe/ Brussels 
(Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2012/december/tradoc_150139.pdf (stating 
that a more predictable regulatory environment will help the many European companies who trade with, and 
have invested in Russia). 
266. See Robert Bridge, Putin Releases Manifesto for Economic Revival, RT (Jan. 30, 2012, 6:49 PM), 
http://rt.com/politics/putin-russia-new-economy-005/. 
267. Mario Cervantes & Daniel Malkin, Russia’s Innovation Gap, OECD OBSERVER, http://www. 
oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/554/Russia_92s_innovation_gap.html. (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
268. Id. 
269. Stefan Wagstyl, World Bank to Russia: Reform or Lose Full Benefits of WTO Membership, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012, 3:56 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/03/27/world-bank-to-
russia-reform-or-lose-out-on-the-full-benefits-of-wto-membership/#axzz2HWLMtcCP. 
270. See, Stuart S. Malawer, The U.S. and the WTO: Lessons Learned for Trade Litigation and Global 
Governance, VIRGINIA LAWYER 15 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.vsb.org/publications/valawyer/ 
apr03/malawer.pdf. 
271. See WTO Working Party Report, supra note 15 (discussing the changes and amendments to Russian 
law in compliance with WTO obligations). 
272. Alexey Portansky, Rossia Dolzhna Stat Aktivnym Igrokom v VTO, PROMROS (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.promros.ru/magazine/2012/dec/aleksej-portanskij-rossiya-dolzhna-stat-aktivnym-igrokom-v-vto.phtml. 
273. Appellate Body Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 7.77; see Errico, supra note 144, at 200-01. 
274. Press Release, SAC Dept. of Int’l L. and Cooperation, supra note 18. 
275. Contra Dunoff, supra note 20, at 281;. 
276. Contra Dunoff, supra note 20, at 281. 
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Furthermore, it could advance predictability and certainty of business climate in 
Russia.277 
Giving WTO law direct effect would give Russian national courts a greater 
role in the system of government.278 Although such reallocation of power to 
courts with regard to WTO law is often viewed as disadvantageous,279 it could 
have some positive effect in Russia by injecting a body of WTO law and WTO 
DSB cases and doctrines directly into the Russian courts.280 This might bring a 
new framework and more sophisticated tests for resolution of business disputes 
by Russian courts.281 On the other hand, Russian courts have been repeatedly 
accused of “telephone justice” and corruption.282 The high-stakes WTO-related 
trade disputes could push them further into overtly political or policy-based 
decision-making mode by making them more susceptible to the pressure from the 
government.283 This would be particularly damaging to Russia’s reputation if 
resolution of WTO law based disputes in Russia’s national courts comes to be 
seen as politically motivated and unjust. Various WTO member states, such as 
the United States, would most certainly use Russian courts as a means of 
bringing Russia into compliance.284 There are other, more benign, options for 
Russia to uphold WTO principles and norms and improve the quality of its 
domestic courts without pronouncing direct effect of WTO law.285 As discussed 
earlier, the ECJ’s approach to WTO law would probably work best for Russia.286 
In addition, Russia also should consider the U.S. model of employing a vigorous 
political process for compliance with WTO law.287 
 
277. See id.; see Alberto Alemanno, Private Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System, Cornell Law 
School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL (Apr. 3, 2004), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/1. 
278. Bronckers, supra note 20, at 240. 
279. For discussion of the U.S. position as to the allocation of power between the branches of government 
in regard to WTO law see supra Part III.B.3. For discussion of the ECJ approach see supra Part III.C. 
280. See, e.g., WTO Working Party Report, supra note 15.  
281. See Malawer, supra note 270, at 15-16. 
282. See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, ‘Telephone Law’ and the ‘Rule of Law:’ The Russian Case, 1 HJRL 241, 
241 (2009), available at https://media.law.wisc.edu/m/nmytc/telephone_law_and_rol.pdf. 
283. Bronckers, supra note 20, at 240. 
284. The United States law repealing Jackson-Vanik and extending permanent normal trade relations 
(“PNTR”) to Russia also serves as a tool to monitor Russia’s compliance with U.S. conditions. See Russia and 
Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, 19 U.S.C. § 
2101 (2012); U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Speech on the Senate floor, December 5, 2012. It requires inter alia that 
the U.S. Trade Representative report annually on Russia’s compliance with its WTO intellectual property rights 
obligations and that the Representative and the Secretary of State report to Congress annually on their efforts to 
promote the rule of law and U.S. investment in Russia. It also requires that the Secretary of Commerce assist 
U.S. business to battle corruption in Russia and “to devote a phone hotline and secure website to allow U.S. 
citizens and business to report on corruption, bribery and attempted bribery in Russia and to request the 
assistance of the U.S. Government if needed.” See id.  
285. See supra Part III.C. 
286. See supra Part III.C. 
287. See supra Part III.B. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The unique structure and distinct dispute resolution system of the WTO 
involves diplomatic methods and applies to member states rather than to 
particular individuals or organizations.288 This makes it difficult to apply WTO 
law directly within a domestic legal system without causing a disturbance in the 
delicate balance of trade policies and uniformity of the WTO law, or without 
creating an unequal playing field for businesses in the competing states.289 
After joining the WTO, Russia is facing a dilemma with regard to the 
applicability and effects of the WTO law within its legal system.290 The Russian 
Constitution generally prescribes that international treaties become an integral 
part of the Russian legal system.291 However, whereas the other WTO members 
do not give WTO law direct effect, and while the WTO itself does not require 
direct application of its law by the signatory states, such unconditional and 
unilateral direct application of WTO law in Russia is not justified.292 To address 
these concerns, Russian courts should further develop already existing legal 
mechanisms that would bar blanket unilateral direct application of WTO law in 
Russia.293 
Although direct application of WTO values and principles would have 
certain advantages for Russia that could prove beneficial for the development of 
the Russian legal system, and for improvement of its business climate and image, 
Russia should be mindful of the real disadvantages that come with direct 
application of WTO law.294 Russia’s higher courts should proceed very carefully 
and draw from the experience of older WTO members as they develop 
mechanisms and tests for sorting out how and when to apply WTO law.295 
The U.S. and the E.U. models represent two different approaches toward 
domestic application of WTO law.296 While the U.S. dualistic approach almost 
completely precludes any direct application of WTO law, and relies almost 
exclusively on the political process for implementation of the WTO obligations 
within the United States, the E.U. model functions slightly differently.297 
Although it generally denies direct effect of WTO law, the E.U. model allows the 
 
288. See supra Part II. 
289. Jackson, supra note 27, at 312; Barcelo, supra note 59, at 148-49. 
290. See supra Parts IV.B, V. 
291. See supra Part IV.A. 
292. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 338-40; see Barceló, supra note 59, at 148-49. As noted by Jacques 
Bourgeois at least one proposal was made during Uruguay Round to require members to give WTO law direct 
effect but the proposal was not supported by major negotiating parties and was dropped. See Bourgeois, supra 
note 20, at 109. 
293. See supra Part IV.A. 
294. See supra Part V. 
295. See supra Parts IV.B-C. 
296. See supra Parts III.A-C. 
297. See supra Parts III.B-C. 
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courts to review specific WTO norms and decide whether an exception for direct 
effect of WTO law could be applicable.298 
The experience of the ECJ could be particularly helpful as the European 
Union is Russia’s main trade partner and Russia shares a monistic approach and 
civil law tradition with many of the E.U. members.299 Russia should consider 
following the ECJ approach by denying direct effect to the WTO norms with 
some exceptions, such as ECJ’s Nakajima exception.300 On the other hand, Russia 
should also borrow from the U.S. experience in developing a more robust 
political process for implementation of WTO obligations and the protection of 
Russian business interests.301 This approach would allow Russia to reap the 
benefits of WTO law within the domestic system without opening itself to 
disadvantages of giving it full direct effect.302 
 
 
298. See supra Part III.C. 
299. “Russia is the third trading partner of the E.U. and the E.U. is the first trading partner of Russia.” 
Regions and Countries: Russia, supra note 206. 
300. See supra Part IV.B. 
301. See supra Part III.B. 
302. See supra Part III.B. 
